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ABSTRACT 
The UK Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015) (CTSA) calls for a partnership between the 
government, individuals, organisations and communities to prevent the radicalisation of individuals 
and to prevent their participation in terrorist and illegal activities. As part of this strategy, universities 
have a statutory duty placed upon them to remain vigilant to signs of extremism. Based upon 20 
interviews with UK university lecturers, the paper examines reactions of the academic community to 
this governmental mandate. Key to our understanding is the deputisation of lecturers into a security 
regime and how they perform the duty of identifying and monitoring extremism. Equally, forms of 
resistance are evident in how lecturers understand their new roles and for universities themselves a 
conservative approach to risk may be gaining traction. We argue there is confusion around the CTSA 
based upon the ambiguous language in which it is presented and the conservative and defensive 
reactions that have subsequently produced concern amongst lecturers and UK universities. 
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Introduction  
In December 2016, we used the UK’s Home Office counterterrorism e-learning training package. The 
package has been designed for public sector workers, including those working in universities, and 
guides users through a series of questions and possible answers. Presented are indicators that users 
can refer to when identifying ‘What does Terrorism Look Like to You’, and these in turn inform their 
vigilance and role in helping to combat terrorism in the UK (see Figure 1) (HM Government 2016). The 
initial questions in the package relate to the meaning of “terrorism”; then users are directed to the 
actual behaviours that might be a cause for concern, for example, “absenteeism”, “crying” and 
“unhealthy use of the Internet” (see Figure 2). The suggestion is: if your students display these 
behaviours, then they may be in danger of extremism. Participating in this training prompted us to 
think about what university staff are being asked to do. Overlooking the disquiet we felt about viewing 
our students with suspicion, we were perplexed as to how we could identify a terrorist or terrorism? 
We also wondered: do other academics express similar reservations towards their counterterrorism 
duty and how does this new role impact on their university responsibilities? In this article, we examine 
how the academic community is reacting to its new-found security role. Framing our thoughts are the 
reactions of academics, as well as the challenges such strategies pose to the intellectual freedoms that 
underpin UK Universities. 
The context to the article is the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (hereafter CTSA; 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/contents/enacted), an act that was “fast-tracked” 
though Parliament (House of Lords, 2015) and one that mandates that “specified authorities” must 
engage with a counterterrorism strategy. As Theresa May – then Home Secretary – stated, 
From 1 July the new statutory Prevent duty for specified authorities will commence. . . Once 
this has been fully implemented it will require local authorities, the police, prisons, 
probationservices, schools, colleges – and yes, universities too – to have due regard to the 
need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. . . This will ensure that Prevent 
activity is consistent across the country and in all those bodies that work with those who may 
be vulnerable. (Home Office 2014aa; emphasis added). 
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Figure 1. What does terrorism look like? 
 
 
Figure 2. Behaviours that cause concern. 
 
 
The CTSA effectively asks those in positions of authority to monitor those they supervise. We know 
monitoring has a significant effect on the subject (Ball 2009), and this is well covered by disciplines 
such as Surveillance Studies (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012). For example, previous work has 
investigated the surveillance of school children (McCahill and Finn 2010), employees (Ball 2010) and 
offenders (Nellis 2006). But what of the effects on those mandated to a national security regime? In 
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recent times, neoliberal approaches and economy models favouring privatisation, de-regulation and 
fiscal austerity have been readily applied to security and this is evidenced through the wider spread 
of countering terror (see Heath-Kelly, Baker-Beall, and Jarvis 2015; Hoijtink 2014). The manner in 
which neoliberal values have also penetrated the field of education has helped to propel contentious 
issues arising from this new approach (see Baltodano 2012; Radice 2013) – for instance, unequal 
opportunities, an increasing audit culture, as well as the increasing educational and bureaucratic 
demands placed on academics (Mountz et al. 2015). More presciently the teaching of terrorism (and 
one could add other “controversial” subjects here) has received critical attention and has been 
assailed by the media and/or legislators for teaching terrorism in a biased form or the authorities’ 
“heavy-handed” responses to using provocative materials. Accusations have included how UK 
universities propagate an anti-Semitic sentiment or the arrest and jailing of a university researcher for 
possessing a copy of an “Al Qaeda training manual” (Durodie 2016; Fitzgerald 2015; Miller, Mills, and 
Harkins 2011). These instances, and others, quite possibly curtail the resources and sources that staff 
are comfortable using when teaching terrorism. Indeed, monitoring for potential radicalisation may 
run counter to some of the established credentials of universities – as Theresa May seems to 
acknowledge with her comment “. . .and yes, universities too”. Not only does the CTSA challenge the 
premise of universities as places with a commitment to free speech, debate and knowledge creation, 
it may also serve to exacerbate the problems it is designed to prevent. As noted by Hillyard (1993) and 
Pantazis and Pemberton (2009), “hard” governmental approaches to countering terrorism often serve 
to boost recruitment to terrorist organisations. For example, tactics such as “stop and search” have 
led to about 1% of those stopped actually being arrested (Miller 2010). “Stop and Search” ultimately 
has served to hinder relations between police and local communities, and with this in mind, the CTSA 
may offer a comparable intervention (see Independent 2016). 
Supporting students and ensuring their welfare is an expectation fairly placed on any university. 
Students do have a right to learn and grow in a safe environment. However, Channel Duty Guidance 
(the government’s guideline on how to report suspicions behaviours) has identified 22 broad-ranging 
criteria that may indicate a student’s likelihood to be drawn into terrorism. Lecturers are expected to 
report on: 
• Feelings of grievance and injustice • Feeling under threat • A need for identity, meaning and 
belonging • A desire for status • A desire for excitement and adventure • A need to dominate 
and control others • Susceptibility to indoctrination • A desire for political or moral change • 
Opportunistic involvement • Family or friends involvement in extremism • Being at a 
transitional time of life • Being influenced or controlled by a group • Relevant mental health 
issues • Over-identification with a group or ideology • ‘Them and Us’ thinking • 
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Dehumanisation of the enemy • Attitudes that justify offending • Harmful means to an end • 
Harmful objectives • Individual knowledge, skills and competencies • Access to networks, 
funding or equipment • Criminal Capability. (Channel 2012) 
Such broad and ambiguous guidance is less than clear for those tasked with performing this new-
found role. Indeed, prompting our initial thoughts towards the conception of this article were 
discussions we had had with colleagues at a departmental seminar on the consistency of Prevent 
training across the Higher Education (HE) sector, as well as how research or “science” was informing 
the guidance. The indicators, as outlined above, we contemplated lacked precision and secondary 
information was often required – for instance, knowing a student’s family are “extremist”. More 
significant perhaps is that the evidence-base that informs the guidance is less than obvious. In relation 
to universities, the CTSA does identify the need “to balance its legal duties in terms of both ensuring 
freedom of speech and academic freedom, and also protecting student welfare” (HM Government 
2015, 4). Despite this, the UK’s leading University and College Union attests that CTSA duties “seriously 
threatens academic freedom and freedom of speech” (see UCU 2015). These are contradictory and 
tension-filled statements that impact upon the academic community and have encouraged a climate 
of risk aversion. This, as we have discovered, can include impeding open debate, because panellists at 
university events are deemed “risky”; create reluctance to sanction research on certain topics; or 
highlight certain individuals because of styles of dress or facial hair. In what follows, the article 
progresses by first, reviewing the theoretical context that frames our conceptual approach, before 
presenting the empirical findings that have been taken from the interviews with university lecturers 
(hereafter we refer to teaching staff as lecturers; this includes all ranks and levels of university 
teachers). In the final section, the findings are discussed in relation to the CTSA, in particular, focusing 
on what we consider to be the adverse impact it is having across the entire academic community. 
 
Countering extremism 
Apparent within recent governmental initiatives have been the reactions of sovereign powers to the 
perceived threat of extremism and radicalisation – for example, responses to ISIS or even events such 
as the UK and France’s interventions in Libya (Bakker and van Zuijdewijn 2015). Notably, these displays 
of sovereign power have tended to be rationalised by Western actors either explicitly through the 
discourse of the Global War on Terror, or in more recent years, moving away fromthis rhetoric and 
focusing on the threat posed by groups such as ISIS (Sekulow and Sekulow 2015; Schmitt 2016). 
Nevertheless, alongside these sovereign demonstration we have seen the extension of a less 
spectacular but still very significant form of power that has rapidly becomemore explicit in form and 
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more widespread in focus, namely, state-led counter-terror interventions. In this way, agendas such 
as the CTSA succeed in coopting a wide array of institutions and specified authorities into conducting 
a counter extremism mandate. Throughout, a governmental power manifests “either directly through 
large scale campaigns, or indirectly through techniques that will make possible, without the full 
awareness of the people” (Foucault 1991: 100). In the example we cite, lecturers are deputised to 
monitor their charges for indications of extremism. Important to contextualising our perspective here 
is the monitoring and social control of “societies of strangers”. 
Works embedded in such perspectives have broadened understandings of some of the changing 
relationships of power, individuals and institutions (see Bauman 2000; DeLanda 2006; Stenson 2010). 
Organisations, institutions and governing authorities at all levels of scale rely on surveillant techniques 
to control risks associated with their activities (Clark 2008; Foucault 2001, 2007; Power 2004). Simply, 
without these bureaucratic functions, modern transactions and activities of all kinds would be difficult 
to perform and maintain (Beck 1992). However, the widespread application of these techniques has 
been posited to cause a number of socially dangerous consequences which stem from their ability to 
discriminate between different population groups within the domains of application. The ability to 
“socially sort” populations (Lyon 2001) into databases has real consequences for populations deemed 
risky (Vlcek 2007). Bureaucratic decisions can, and often do, result in varying levels of convenience, 
access to services, use of space and life chances (see Graham 2005; Surveillance Studies Network 
2010).  
In addition, there is an increasing array of individuals and organisations that perform risk analysis roles 
which are intended to limit harms, such as illegal movement of money, people or terrorism (Mueller 
and Stewart 2011). Deputised into these roles are “control workers” who make decisions about who 
may or may not pose a risk (see Rose 2000). Often performed through categorisation, as individuals 
or collections of individuals, these people are identified because they are viewed to be outside 
designated thresholds of acceptable risk (see Ericson and Haggerty 1997). Control workers are those 
tasked with monitoring the thresholds and breeches of these maxima; in turn, automated, algorithmic 
or human monitoring systems guide the decision-making towards what Gandy (2012) calls 
“cumulative” disadvantages. 
Since 2001, there has been a growing prevalence of digital monitoring or reporting; for example, 
banks, car dealership or purveyors of high-end goods must report suspicious activity (Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002). A blurring of the boundaries between those under the auspiciousness of the security 
services and those within the private sector has enjoyed a growing maturity (see Ball et al. 2015). 
Moreover, a pre-emptive agenda which targets risky activities, individuals or organisations using 
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information harvested from multifarious sources is now standard practice in the UK. Mined data is a 
key source in identifying and countering threats (DeGoede 2008) and has engineered a new 
securitisation dependant on the collaboration of the private sector and governmental departments. 
Reflecting these developments and as has been noted by recent work on security, is the rise of a 
neoliberal agenda which seeks to responsibilise non-state actors to perform security roles (Goold, 
Loader, and Thumala 2010; Loader and Walker 2010). Driving enquiry into these developments is a 
need for greater understanding of the new political economies of security (Huysmans 2011; White 
2011). UK governmental initiatives, such as Prevent (2009) or Request a Check (see Home Office 2014) 
encourage non-traditional participation by enrolling “special” actors – who are in effect deputised to 
perform security. The deputisation is mandated through the legislation and actors, for example, 
designated staff – i.e. a Money Laundering Reporting Officer who must report suspicious activity (see 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (2016) is another 
example, where internet providers must retain the previous 12 months of customers online activity. 
The significance of these types of changes has been examined at state level (Adey 2012), and in 
relation to activities such as airline travel (Bennett 2005). Indeed, in a climate where increasingly non-
security specialist organisations are implicated in national security regimes, this is an important 
conceptual development in the impact and enrolment of university staff, as it poses questions about 
the political and indeed, labour expectations that the strategy demands. 
Adding to this movement towards organisations playing a new security role is the impact of the 
mandate on those with new security responsibilities. It would appear the CTSA is producing a 
conservative effect on universities. What underscores this effect is deterrence (Penney 2016; Schauer 
1978). For example, drivers are deterred from speeding because if caught they will face a fine or 
imprisonment; the penalty deters illegal activity. However, as Schauer (1978) is careful to point out, 
there is also a more benign element to deterrence, an inhibitory effect caused by, for example, 
infringing a person’s will to express an opinion or act in otherwise legal contexts. The unease felt 
echoes Jackson’s (2016) dilemma when recognising moments of “self-censor”. Critical Terrorism 
Studies (CTS) scholars may accept invitations to government events, or may contribute to policy 
documents, because not doing so will limit opportunities to work with the state. This, as Jackson 
argues, “legitimates and perpetuates” the implementation of such strategies. Indeed, as researchers 
we are told we must be policy relevant and so by our acquiescence, we may sanction counter-terror 
systems rather than challenge or deconstruct them. 
Alternatively, as Toros (2016) contends, there are still benefits to be had by sitting down with 
policymakers in expanding the input of the academic community. Ours is a challenge to governmental 
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initiatives and our observations serve to highlight the complicity and resistance within the academic 
community that may be influencing the implementation of the CTSA. With the recognition that 
activities are surveilled, recorded and data-mined, a blanket of caution influences what is understood 
as risky – for example, Muslim-Americans viewing certain websites post 9/11 or the use of social media 
(see Marder et al. 2016; Sidhu 2011). 
However, there may also be another important factor here and one that Scott (2013) calls “anarchist 
calisthenics”, a concept that suggests people must practise small resistances often in order to be 
prepared for moments when bigger issues or resistances are needed. These resistances refer to low-
level law-breaking, for example, “jaywalking” or crossing the road when it is clear and the red 
pedestrian light is showing. Such small disobediences help to erode the fear one may have to resist or 
make a stand against a law or a governmental position or civil order. Small resistances and “dragging 
one’s feet” are a tentative form of protest with the potential to explode into greater forms of protest. 
Nevertheless, others have argued that the passivity of universities towards their adoption of 
governmental agendas and neoliberal approaches to both education and countering terrorism 
(Mountz et al. 2015; Radice 2013) aids the reach and acceptance of neoliberal policies and a continued 
drive for bureaucratically influenced betterment. 
Academics have security responsibilities, yet the rules of engagement or how they are expected to act 
remain unclear. And so the ambiguity surrounding the Act heightens tensions and fears – which as we 
argue culminate in conservatism, anxieties and resistance around doing something culpable (see 
Favarel-Garrigues et al. 2011; Power 2004). Within universities, management and staff have started 
to take a risk-averse approach to activities deemed controversial (Gardella 2006). This, we argue, is a 
form of bureaucratic conservatism where university management limits potential for risk which in turn 
causes a ripple effect, where those subject to the conservatism restrict their expectations and 
behaviours (Palfreyman 2007). This, at times, has been coupled with policies that identify certain 
communities as “suspects” and the “other” (read the Muslim community), all of which intensifies a 
politic of fear (Mythen, Walklate, and Khan 2009; Allen 2010; Spalek 2010; Moosavi 2013). “Suspect 
community” and “risk” have promoted contentious stereotypes, which in turn have exacerbated 
community tensions around feelings of suspicion and stigmatisation (Awan 2012; Mythen and 
Walklate 2016). 
Indeed, previous CTS work acknowledges a need for greater engagement with isolated and pilloried 
communities (see Breen Smyth 2007; Gunning 2009). However, our focus is on a community with no 
security agenda that is being asked to police “risk” groups (see Ericson and Haggerty 2007). Elements 
of the CTSA target Muslims and this may also be evident in the wider narratives of Muslims as being 
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the new “folk devils” (Abbas 2005; Alam and Husband 2013; Awan and Zempi 2015). Islamophobia as 
a social construct not only results in hate crime victimisation, but it can be used to target groups who 
are deemed to be problematic (Copsey et al. 2013; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010). Recent 
literature on Islamophobia has been concerned with victimisation (Allen, Isakjee, and Young 2013; 
Littler and Feldman 2015; Meer 2010; Perry 2001; Taras 2012), and in educational literature there has 
been a focus on the stigmatisation of students and the impacts of security regimes on the identity and 
perceptions of Muslim students (see Kyriacou et al. 2017; Hopkins 2011). In contrast, our study makes 
the case that a new form of institutional targeting is now increasingly being adopted through state 
measures that do not necessarily only impact upon Muslim students, but also those tasked with new 
roles of monitoring. We argue that the CTSA duty on Universities impacts upon those from all 
backgrounds, religious beliefs and communities who are monitored, and importantly, have to monitor. 
 
Talking to lecturers 
The research that informs the article sets out to provide an initial and exploratory study into the 
specific nature of university lecturers’ perceptions of their CTSA duty, with the focus placed on 
qualitative depth rather than volume of participants. To achieve this, we conducted 
20 semi-structured interviews with university lecturers between April and November of 2016. While 
the CTSA duty has implications in HE wider than just lecturers, this study deliberately chose to focus 
on university lecturers due to the breadth of work they carry out, including teaching, supervision, 
research, organising and running academic events and administration. An initial group of 6 
participants were selected purposively in the first instance to produce a small group that reflected 
diversity in academic discipline, geographical/ institutional location and gender. This was then 
snowballed (Silverman 2013) to include 20 participants that further diversified the sample. 
Participant’s levels of seniority included lecturers, senior lecturers, associate professors/readers and 
professors. Moreover, the disciplinary spread included Criminology, Computer Sciences, Law, 
Education, Social Science, Business and Politics. The gender make-up of participants was 13 male and 
7 female. The geographical range included participants from universities across the UK. 
Given that the initial sampling technique was initially selective and subsequently expanded, we are 
not claiming that the findings can be generalised across HE or that the findings are exhaustive. Instead, 
the modest sample size reflects the exploratory nature of the study. However, the detail in which 
these interviews were conducted did mean that a sizeable amount of qualitatively rich data was 
generated (over 30 h of interviews). 
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We acknowledge a more sizeable and random sample could draw out additional themes and 
perspectives and shed light on those academics with a more favourable interpretation of their duty. 
However, this is a theme we did not find and therefore should be explored in more substantive future 
work. After 20 interviews had been conducted, we considered the study “complete” insofar as new 
theoretical categories were not materialising (see Milliken 1999: 234). The interviews were conducted 
in a semi-structured manner with a series of scripted questions that each participant was asked in 
order to ensure a certain degree of consistency between interviews; but then, around these questions 
space was granted for further discussion and elaboration. Initial questions sought to: 
● Determine if participants were aware of the Prevent Duty and the CTSA more generally; 
● Establish how participants understood key terms in the CTSA; 
● Examine participants’ views on the University’s role in tackling extremism; 
● Document participant’s views on their own individual role in tackling extremism. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, over the phone, via email and using Skype. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed so that the authors could discuss the findings and conduct a thematic 
analysis of the transcripts. We conducted this analysis as part of the ongoing and reflective process, 
where each author went through the transcripts to familiarise themselves with the entire data set 
before independently identifying themes and cross examining these with the findings of the other 
authors. After reviewing the interviews, we decided that a number of themes were sufficiently 
widespread across the transcripts that we organised our findings in relation to deputisation, resistance 
and bureaucratic conservativism. 
 
Working with the CTSA 
We themed our findings along three prominent topics: first, the deputisation of lecturers and the 
tensions evident in how they understand and accept their new responsibilities; second, resistance to 
the CTSA through small and mundane acts of disobedience committed by lectures’ and third, 
bureaucratic conservatism and risk-averse interpretations understood and experienced by universities 
in relation to the CTSA. 
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Deputisation 
In our interviews, participants keenly identified a pressing tension to their CTSA roles, namely, an 
understanding of university as a place for the development and expressions of intellectual freedom, 
which for many academics runs counter to the CTSA mandate to monitor for suspicious behaviour. 
Pressing in the views of the lecturers was how the CTSA duty serves to undermine some of the core 
functions of the university. As one respondent put it: 
. . .Its [University’s] primary function is about debate, conduct of research, producing and 
disseminating knowledge and also dissent I think is really important. Universities should be a 
space for speaking truth to power [. . .] this kind of responsibility makes that far more difficult. 
(Politics, South East, Male) 
As the lecturer suggests, being duty-bound to act upon signs of potential radicalisation is problematic, 
especially if it is viewed as curtailing academic freedoms (Lukianoff 2014) and intimating the topics 
students may feel comfortable discussing. The following participant continues in this vein: 
If I was expected to engage in significant monitoring of students it is likely that they (or at least 
some groups) would consider me to be a member of the state (or at least university) apparatus 
and be significantly more suspicious of me and cautious of what could be said. 
(Sociology, Yorkshire, Male) 
Identifying as being a member of the state, or indeed as a “control worker”, may run counter to how 
the lecturer views themselves; but it may also have the effect of limiting the expression of a student 
who dresses in a certain way or has a certain viewpoint. For the following participant, limiting 
freedoms of expressions is again of deep concern: 
How can we build trust with our students when the very thing we are doing will create 
suspicion and mistrust? I am genuinely not sure now whether someone wearing a headscarf 
or if someone has a beard should warrant me contacting the relevant services. I mean that’s 
worrying because it’s not just me who thinks like this. I have had colleagues contact me and 
say to me is she someone who needs reporting because she wears a face veil and has said she 
had travelled to Turkey for a holiday. (Social Sciences, East Midlands, Female) 
These comments highlight the unease surrounding a securitisation designed to maintain the safety of 
the UK, and beyond (Bausch and Zeitzoff 2015). Premised on much of the political mire of post 9/11, 
Iraq and now Syria, there is a deliberate and sustained focus on certain communities that have been 
deemed risky (Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Heath-Kelly 2013). The repercussions of such an 
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approach often serve to make the targeted group feel isolated and labelled as different from host 
populations, with a limited effect on countering risk (see McGovern and Tobin 2010). In this instance, 
religious and political identity become targeted by association, and Choudhury and Fenwick (2011) 
attest that British Muslims and young British men in particular feel a sense of alienation and 
resentment towards CTSA programmes and counterterrorism legislation. Participants identified 
Muslim students as those who would ultimately bear the brunt of the mandate disseminated from 
government to the university, as well as extending the idea that “[c]ounter-terrorism measures are 
contributing to a wider sense among Muslims that they are being treated as a ‘suspect community’ 
and targeted by authorities simply because of their religion” (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 11; see 
also; Hickman et al. 2011). 
An institution premised on producing knowledge and speaking “truth to power” that is being co-opted 
into a programme of state surveillance offers conflicts of interest – particularly when particular 
populations are being targeted. The approach deepens tensions of suspicion and mistrust, thus 
reducing the ability of staff and students to engage, debate and reflect on “controversial” or risky 
topics, a key premise to the ethos of universities to explore and foster knowledge (Kyriacou et al. 
2017). However, equally pressing is a sense of “not knowing what to do” in the face of new-found 
requirements and the ambiguity as to how the CTSA is to be actioned: 
. . .we didn’t have a strategy as an institution to deal with it so we were feeling around in the 
dark a little bit about how best to respond to the concerns that had been raised to us as 
academic staff and I think we probably took quite a risk averse approach. . . and I’m not 
suggesting that’s necessarily a bad thing but I think that until we see some clearer guidance 
or guidelines around the sort of strategy that we should be adopting as an institution I think 
there are potential dangers and there are potential consequences for students and their 
futures if we are too risk averse and how we respond to any concerns that are raised. 
(Criminology, East Midlands, Male) 
Despite training programmes and extensive training initiatives by the Home Office, none of the 
participants we spoke to had undergone CTS training (something we return to later in the article). 
Consequently, a climate of uncertainty and unease prevails in how lecturers understand the roles they 
are expected to perform. In addition, the potential damage to student–lecturer relations and 
hindrances to freedom of expression or debate equally contribute to the discomfort expressed by 
participants. 
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Resistance 
The CTSA has added to staff workloads, ones that are often already stretched and overloaded (see 
Mountz et al. 2015), and this too may add to the reluctance of staff when engaging with the CTSA; not 
only are they unsure of what to do, but they are committed to other teaching, research and 
administrative tasks. As one participant identifies, there may be something dangerous about 
deputising underprepared staff: 
. . .Staff are just simply not qualified to do this, academic staff are not psychologists or 
psychiatrists, they’re not counter-terrorist practitioners, they’re frequently overworked and 
balancing multiple responsibilities. There is something particularly dangerous I think about 
asking staff to become involved in these kind of matters. (Politics, South East, Male) 
Indeed, within the climate of neoliberal approaches to education, the increasing pressures and labours 
on academics, as well as security roles, expose the tentative and awkward reasoning lecturers apply 
to their new-found responsibilities. Ultimately, this is something they feel underprepared to 
accomplish, and the more forceful pressure of the “neoliberal university” takes precedent (see Ball 
2012). 
However, it is in these fractious moments where “little” resistances to the responsibilities of CTSA 
come to the fore. For many, the demands of the CTSA are beyond their role as educators: “I am not 
going to deal with [CTSA]. . . I will not report something, but if I know a person is going to plant a 
bomb, then yes, I will call the police” (Law, South East, Female). Echoing the everyday anarchist calls 
of Scott (2013), this lecturer is adamant they will not be reporting unless there is a clear and vibrant 
danger – something the auspiciousness of civil duty would motivate rather than the mandate of the 
CTSA. In addition, antipathy to responsiblisation focuses on threats to academic freedoms. The 
following participant elaborates: 
I think people think very strongly about it, and I think, you know [University] has a reputation 
for being radical political place. I think it would totally undermine our sort of, core bits of our 
identity if we were suddenly trying to squash debate in that way. (Politics, South East, Female) 
This comment, for us, presents an interesting overview of the role now sought within universities. The 
department in question was once celebrated for its radical views, and this refers back to its Marxist 
positioning in the 1970s and 1980s, which to some degree allowed it to challenge the more generalist 
political rhetoric of the time in the UK. The freedom to challenge and debate is viewed as a central 
component of the department’s identity (Royed 1996) – an identity the CTSA is clearly challenging. 
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Elsewhere, participants expressed that their CTSA duty would have a countering effect on initiating 
the role on lectures in securitising universities and those enrolled in them: 
The question with a general policy statement like that is how will universities translate into 
practice and I’m sure you’ll find that there are many different attitudes and approaches across 
different universities. You might get some that follow it quite slavishly, you might get some 
that pay lip service to it and don’t really buy into the underlying ethos and you might get some 
that frankly don’t pay any regard to it at all. (Law, Wales, Male) 
Dismissing one’s CTSA responsibilities or providing the minimum of effort when performing them, we 
contend, offers some perspective on how the resistances to it are being actualised. This is separate to 
the institutional responses of universities, as we will see below, but at the “coal-face” of where 
lectures meet and interact with students a principle of doing the bare minimum and not fully 
participating in what the CTSA demands may demonstrate the form of resistance most readily 
available to lectures – albeit one that has the potential to escalate into organised protest and 
disobedience. 
 
Bureaucratic conservatism 
For UK universities, a different approach may be apparent and here we draw on what we consider to 
be bureaucratic conservatism in UK Universities – a conservatism that stems from CTSA directives and 
influences the management of UK Universities, where universities have adopted a compliant position 
towards contentious issues. Focusing on this phenomenon, one participant commented that there is 
a “paranoia surrounding ongoing events within the university” (Sociology, West Midlands, Female), 
and that this has manifested itself in the form of growing amounts of paperwork: for example, external 
speakers must be fully vetted before attending the university. The process includes completing a form 
with details of the speaker, the topic of the talk and where and when it will take place. The form must 
be approved within the department and within the faculty. As a participant explains: 
We tried to organise a conference and invited a number of guest speakers. However we had 
to fill in all these forms and once we completed them the University rejected our application. 
We were never told why except that the list of speakers and event I think was too sensitive, 
because it was about terrorism. . . (Sociology, Midlands, Male) 
Terrorism is undoubtedly a sensitive subject and one with challenging and probing issues. However, 
as this participant felt, if the subject matter is being restricted due to its sensitivity, then this is overtly 
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effecting open debate and learning. The following participant speaks of the unease that has been 
injected into her supervisory relationship with a PhD student: 
It… feels a bit awkward, for instance I have a Saudi PhD student and I always have to remind 
her that if she is going away, she has to notify the authorities, everything she needs to do she 
has got to ask permission in a way that other students don’t. And I feel a bit apologetic about 
it and you know, a little bit like I am part of this system that doesn’t trust her. It is quite minor. 
I certainly don’t feel scared or suspicious of students I don’t think. (Education, South West, 
Female) 
To ensure compliance, the student is reminded of their obligations to register where they are. The 
participant may be doing this with good intent – i.e. not wanting the student to get in “trouble”. 
However, as the participant notes, because this student is a non-European Economic Area (non-EEA) 
student they face greater scrutiny. Evident are sensations of awkwardness in performing the role 
assigned to the participant. The participant draws on trust and how the student is ultimately 
stigmatised due to their nationality, but more pressing here is how the participant acknowledges she 
is part of the system – a system she is clearly ill-at-ease with, but one she must be complicit with. 
Another aspect of the PhD process is acquiring ethical clearance for research. The following participant 
talks about the difficulty associated with ethical approval for PhD research at their university since the 
CTSA duty came into effect: 
Ethics reviews are more difficult doing this kind of research. But I guess it show ups the 
difficulties of ethical review processes, because if you are doing research on far right extremist 
websites that actually ethics is a constant negotiation rather than a review that happens at 
one point in time and then is kind of dealt with. I think it is also about the relationship with 
the person, so the student has a history of involvement in antiracist practice... So I guess it is 
about knowing the project I have and the risk of radicalisation through exposure to these 
spaces and I also think it is really important to have the freedom to go on these spaces and 
understand these space. Because how are you going to combat things like racism, it is 
important to understand how these ideologies are produced, how they circulate, how they 
are consumed. (Geography, Scotland, Male) 
As the participant identifies, research (in particular, at postgraduate and post-doctoral levels) is aimed 
at producing “a contribution to knowledge”, doing something original around a given topic. Hyper-
sensitivity with regard to ethics committees as a result of the CTSA duty is not only problematic in how 
it could erect frustrating barriers preventing the undertaking of this sort of research, but is also 
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potentially a counter-productive symptom of a university’s interpretation of the duty imposed upon 
them (Pruzan 2016). In this instance, knowing the student, their history and the project is a clear 
feature in how the supervisor evaluates his participation in the project and this can be viewed in how 
risk is established and acted upon. The participant was also keen to suggest that without a history of 
anti-racist practice then the student may not have been looked upon favourably. 
 
Impacts on the academic community 
In moving towards a conclusion, we offer three points in expanding how we may begin to understand 
the impacts of CTSA in UK Universities. First, in thinking about deputisation, we borrow from Rose 
(2000) and Ericson and Haggerty (1997) in highlighting the role of the “control worker” – those with 
administrative authority that work to elevate risk and ensure sanctity. These workers are, in the first 
instance, the managers of universities that grant the presence of outside speakers or overview the 
ethical clearance of projects. It is they who are the overseer of the CTSA in universities. If there is any 
doubt to the sensitive nature of an activity, then it will face their scrutiny. This, we stress, refers to 
mundane and innocuous activities – such as student access to information, student debates, external 
speakers or researching particular topics deemed “sensitive”. What prevails is an atmosphere of 
suspicion and fear towards certain research topics, particular events and communities. Participants 
highlight a fear that universities have embraced a process of self-discipline – one designed to avoid 
repercussions of adverse publicity a “sensitive” event may promote (see Guardian 2015). 
Consequently, there is a conservatism in how universities manage risk and how certain freedoms are 
understood.  
Combined with this, the lecturer is also a “control worker” and this, we contend, is designed into the 
flows and events of life teaching in a university. In our institution, for instance, we are instructed to 
take a roll-call and record a student’s presence or absence from lectures and seminars. Our conduct 
is shaped by an established logic of record keeping (cf. Caplan 2011). We already monitor students, 
we already record their absence. We categorise a student’s presence and from this we infer a 
student’s attitude, application or credentials. Much like the CTSA’s 22 Framework, this can be used as 
an indicator of risk (Deleuze 1992). In this case, if absences prevail the student will be questioned or 
asked to leave. Policing through categorisation, as Ericson and Haggerty (1997) suggest, structures the 
actions and reactions of not just the police force, but multifarious actors, such as lecturers. This is 
achieved with regulations and socially accepted control measures. Decisions made, not just about the 
individual, but circumstantial categories surrounding the individual – where do they live, employment 
history, drug misuse, presence on electoral role, credit history, family circumstances – frame how we 
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manage risk. It is no coincidence that credit is secured using many of the same categories (see Burton 
et al. 2004; Leyshon and Thrift 1999). The Home Office eLearning Figures that started this article 
alongside the 22 Framework are categories and framed responses that help “control workers” to make 
decisions. Yet, as our findings suggest, control workers remain confused on exactly what it is they have 
to do and why. 
Second, there are varying degrees of resistance to the CTSA and these can take the form of university 
lectures “dragging their feet” when dealing with their new found security roles. These behaviours of 
ignoring the less than obvious, relying on common sense or “paying lip service” reflect low-level 
disobedience and irritation, as opposed to an outright refusal to fulfil the demands of the CTSA. 
Examples of more organised resistance are observable; open letters have been signed by academic 
experts and published in national newspapers (Guardian 2016) and as mentioned, the largest HE union 
has adopted an anti-Prevent stance. However, as far as we can ascertain, no major protest or objection 
has been lodged by university staff towards the CTSA, yet the comments presented here suggest how 
university staff are protesting in their own small ways. 
Third, bureaucratic conservatism is a form of compliance and UK Universities have assumed a stance 
of practicality and efficiency when engaging with the CTSA. Take for example the many Prevent Groups 
now established in UK Universities, tasked with implementing counter-radicalisation and extremism 
agendas. The groups consist of a range of university staff, but are predominately management-led 
with an emphasis on: providing information and training to staff; producing and overseeing a protocol 
on the management of speakers and events; and managing the CTSA process among the student 
community. As Qurashi (2017) considers of his experiences in one such group, academic expertise is 
“side-lined” and there is little room for engagement with the authoritative position the CTSA demands 
of universities. As he suggests in citing ex-US Vice President Dick Cheney, it is not about analysis but 
about response to the situation. Absent is the critical voice of what the CTSA is asking the group to do; 
rather, the emphasis is on the practicality of ensuring the University attains the responsibilities placed 
upon it. Underscoring this approach, lecturers feel that universities are overly cautious in their 
interpretations of the CTSA. This, as we have suggested, may be due to perceived challenges on 
intellectual freedoms, but also evident is animosity to the defensive approaches taken by the 
universities. Undoubtedly, the education sector is not a homogenous entity and there is a range of 
responses from different institutions – not surprising given the lack of prescription handed down by 
the government. In fact, aspects of it have already been deemed not to apply to certain universities 
with Oxford and Cambridge debating societies both gaining exemption from the ban against 
“extremist speakers” (Espinoza 2015). 
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Conclusion 
To gain some clarity on the impact of the CTSA, we submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request 
to the Home Office. We asked for details on the amount of referrals made, how these referrals 
corresponded to the Channel assessment framework, did referrals lead to participation in de-
radicalisation programmes, and completion rates of university staff on CTSA training programmes. We 
learnt that 29,238 Higher Education/Further Education (HE/FE) staff (this includes any post-secondary 
school study towards a degree or a vocational qualification) have received training. Nevertheless, our 
other requests were declined on the basis of Section 22 and Section 36 of the Freedom of Information 
Act (see Supplemental data for the FOI). In the first instance, Section 22 refers to information that may 
be printed in the future, but no further detail was supplied – i.e. possible date of publication. Section 
36 refers to the fact that releasing the information may prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs 
and there is a lack of public interest in the disclosure. The response lacked precision and certainly did 
not adequately answer our questions. This may be a continued reflection of the ambiguity of the CTSA 
message. Moreover, the amount of staff who have received training is limited. While 29,238 of all 
HE/FE staff may have participated in CTSA training, there are 201,380 academic staff and 208,750 non-
academic staff working in UK Universities alone (Universities UK 2017). The inconsistency of training 
across the sector will be a contributing factor when lecturers express their lack of knowledge when 
tasked with identifying radical behaviours, and this lack of knowledge exists while staff are bound by 
the CTSA mandate to monitor and report. However, this is not to say that more training represents 
the answer to all the issues raised here. While it may serve to increase lecturer’s feelings of being 
more knowledgeable about the subject and in turn, their confidence identifying the signs of 
radicalisation, it does not address deeper issues within the knowledge base that informs the training 
(Lloyd and Dean 2015) – a significant problem that will be hard to overcome until all the research 
informing aspects like the ERG22 are published and debated (see Guardian 2016). 
The CTSA is an expansion of state-led security into the educational sector and our goal has been to 
establish how lecturers understand their CTSA roles and to document their thoughts on the duty. 
Notwithstanding the threats posed by terrorism and the uncontroversial desire that the government 
has to prevent politically motivated violence against civilians, there are clearly concerns about the 
practical implications of making this a legal requirement to “inform” on students as potential 
extremists. In addition, institutions face a challenge to their renown for openness, tolerance and 
freedom of expression. Why a style of dress can be worrisome or why the topic of debate is reportable 
to government agencies, all remain deeply problematic to the lecturers we spoke to in UK Universities. 
Through formally enshrining this duty in law and deputising academic staff into a programme of state 
surveillance, the government risks breeding more suspicion between students and staff. Staff remain 
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uncomfortable with the CTSA because they are being asked to act in a way that runs contrary to their 
understanding of what universities and expressions of intellectual freedoms, as well as creating an 
environment where staff with inadequate indicators are expected to monitor and report on suspicious 
behaviour. 
The findings in this article concentrate on deputisation, resistance and bureaucratic conservatism, and 
these offer some semblance as to how we can begin to understand the effects of the CTSA in 
education. Universities must interpret the responsibility handed down to them and furthermore, 
university staff must make their own decisions as to how they carry out their duty (if at all). The CTSA 
has been accused of hindering opportunities to engage in open debate, restricting research around 
“sensitive” topics and creating a divide between staff and students. This is a counter-productive 
approach and one reminiscent of the heavy-handed government approaches of the past (see 
Hillyard 1993). Moreover, lecturer’s responsibilities have grown ever wider in terms of administration 
and pastoral care on top of their teaching and research. The CTSA adds security expectations upon 
these day-to-day duties. The argument here is not intended to highlight that lecturers are frequently 
spread thin across a range of diverse roles but, instead, that these extra statutory duties, a sense of 
ambiguity around the specifics of these duties and a questionable evidence base for them could in 
fact be dangerous as well as counter-productive. A void of comprehension poses a serious risk of 
defensive reporting as well as a disproportionate focus on suspect communities. Without adequate 
knowledge and skills lecturers are not equipped to conduct the work mandated upon them. More 
pressing, we would argue, the neoliberal approaches adopted by governments and universities 
towards security and education present a troubling perspective on how profit may override all else 
and indeed how open and critical debate is enjoyed. We contend much more detailed work is needed 
on how measures such as the CTSA impact on those living and working in UK society. 
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